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INSTITUTIONAL OWNERS AND CORPORATE
MANAGERS: A GERMAN DILEMMA
Friedrich K. Kiibler*
Professor Buxbaum's impressive analysis is based on his in-
timate knowledge and perfect understanding of German law.
There is no reason for contradiction or correction. He asks
whether there is anything the United States can learn from Ger-
man institutions. I will ask the converse: how can the German
aspirations for reform be guided by the American experience?
My answer will be given in three parts: First, I will mention very
briefly some of the basic features of the German scene in order
to illustrate the marked differences, or perhaps more accurately,
the wide gap between the two systems. Next, I will review in a
nutshell the current proposals for change and the discussions
they have triggered. Finally, I will address what might be the
basic choices Germany is facing today. I hope this will bring me
back to the important conclusions of Professor Buxbaum's
article.
L INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
GERMANY
Toward the end of his article, Professor Buxbaum describes
Europe as having "older and deeper economic, political, and so-
cial structures."' This description appears to be particularly true
for Germany. In terms of Robert Clark's "Four Stages of Capi-
talism' 2 we are still sitting on the first two steps of the stairway.
While this cannot be fully explained here, it may prove useful to
outline four essential points:
* Professor for Wirtschafts-und Bargerliches Recht, Direktor de3 Instituts fdr Ban-
krecht, Universitlt Frankfurt am Main; Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia. The Brooklyn Law Review has relied on the author for citation style and
substance for many of the foreign sources used in this article.
I Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Per-
spective, 57 BROOKLYN L REV. 1, 38 (1991).
1 Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management
Treatises, 94 HAuv. L. Ray. 561 (1981).
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1. The general structure of German corporate law is very
rigid; it is much closer to its American counterpart of three gen-
erations ago than to current Delaware or California statutes or
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act. The emphasis is
still on creditor protection. This is particularly true for the stock
corporation (Aktiengesellschaft). Germany requires legal capital
to be fixed by the articles of incorporation; the minimum
amount is prescribed by statute;3 the distribution of earnings is
restricted by mandatory reserve requirements; in most cases the
repurchase of the corporation's own stock is illegal. Existing
stockholders are preferred to investors. There is no general dis-
closure requirement for the public distribution of securities," but
whenever the corporation issues new stock there are mandatory
preemptive rights for its shareholders.' All private companies
(GmbH) with more than five hundred employees and all stock
corporations are required to have both a managing and a super-
visory board. One third of the seats on the supervisory board are
given to the representatives of the employees and their unions.7
This number is increased to one half in enterprises with more
than two thousand employees. This institutionalization of
codetermination is only one aspect of a dramatically different
system of labor relations: its key element is the works council
(Betriebsrat), a mandatory committee elected by the employees
to represent their interests and voice their demands against
management. Thus codetermination integrates the works council
and, to a lesser extent, the unions into some parts of corporate
planning and responsibility.
2. Institutional investment in Germany is not easily ex-
plained in a few words. Endowments are nonexistent. Industrial
foundations, like the Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung or the Robert-Bosch-
Actually it is 100,000 DM for the stock corporation and 50,000 DM for the private
company (GmbH).
" For a comparative analysis, see F. KOBLER, AKTIE, UNTERNEHMENSFINANZIERUNG
UND KAPITALMARKT (1989).
5 Hopt, Vom Aktien-und Barsenrecht zum Kapitalmarktrecht?, 140 ZEITSCHORI
FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELS-UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 141, 201, 389 (1976-77); H.-D. Ass-
MANN, POSPEKTHAFTUNG 75-79 (1985).
6 For a comparative and economic study, see KUbler, Mendelson & Mundheim, Die
Kosten des Bezugsrechts, 35 Dm AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 461 (1990).
7 For details, see F. KOBLER, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 407 (3d ed. 1990); for a compara-
tive evaluation, see Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of
Problems and Potential, 4 J. CoMP. CoRP. L. & SEc. REG. 155 (1982).
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Stiftung, are institutional owners but not real institutional in-
vestors; they are mostly limited to holding shares in a single en-
trprise.8 Pension funds so far have had very little importance.
The same is largely true for investment funds. It may be that
they have never fully recovered from the blow they received a
generation ago from Bernie Cornfield and his International
Overseas Services.10 Their number is very limited,"" and they ap-
pear to be particularly unattractive if they invest in the equity
segment of the securities market.1 2 Moreover, they are domi-
nated by banks.' 3 Thus, among the five categories of institu-
tional investors discussed by Professor Buxbaum,"' only two are
relevant to the German scene: insurance companies and banks.
Insurance companies have always been subject to strict limita-
tions with regard to investment in equity,'5 and often they do
not even use the very restricted opportunities allowed by law.
However, the largest German insurance conglomerate, Allianz,
by the sheer volume of its funds, appears to have some impact
on public corporations.16 The biggest issue, however, has been
and remains the banks. The bank issue may become still more
acute due to the fact that the separation between the banking
and the insurance industries, which has never been legally man-
dated, is slowly evaporating.'7 For a long time the big banks
8 For details, see H. Kno~ICM STIFTUNGSTYPUS UND UNTERNEHMENSTRXGERSMIFUNG
188, 271 (1988).
9 See notes 22-27 infra.
10 See C. RAw, B. PAGE & G. HODGSON, Do You SiNcnnsy Whirr To B: RiC?, 244
(1971).
11 By the end of 1988 there were 35 domestic funds offering shares to the public: 28
invest in securities, seven in real estate. See Baur, Investmengeschiafte, in HANDBUCH
DEs KAPrrANLAGERECHTS 534 (H.-D. Assmann & R. Sch(ltze eds. 1990).
12 See 31 Monatsberichte der Deutschen Bundesbank Nr. 8, 11; Schneider, Auf dem
Weg in den Pensionskassenkorporatismus? 35 DiE AKTMEGESELLSCHAPT 317, 319 (1990).
13 See BFMCHT DER STUD NKombussIoN, GRUNDSATZURAGEN DER KEDImTRTSCHArr
67 (1979).
14 Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 7.
15 The general rule is that they may invest only five percent of their capital and only
in shares of listed corporations; for a discussion see Reuter, Welche Maflnahmen
empfehlen sich, insbesondere im Gesellschafts-und Kapitalmarktrecht, urn die
Eigenkapitalausstattung der Unterneunen langfristig zu verbe.sern? 55 DznscHM
JuRisTpmAG B 90 (1984).
"6 This can be inferred from the number of seats its top managers occupy on the
supervisory boards of such corporations. See the figures in Monopolkommission,
Gesamtwirtschaftliche Chancen und Risiken wachsender Unternehmensgrssen, in
HAUPTGUTACHTEN 156 (1984-85).
17 Deutsche Bank has started its own insurance business. Aachen Manchener Ver-
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have owned blocks of shares of industrial corporations. The most
spectacular example is certainly the 28.5 percent holding of
Deutsche Bank in Daimler-Benz.18 This has become even more
of an issue since Daimler-Benz controls AEG and was allowed to
acquire Messerschmidt-B61kow-Blohm, thus becoming the num-
ber one German industrial conglomerate. When one examines
the statistics, the situation appears to be much less dramatic.
The Federation of German Banks contends that the holdings of
the ten largest private banks-and they are the only ones that
matter-in the aggregate equity of all German stock corpora-
tions declined from 1.32 percent in 1976 to 0.57 percent in
1989.19 To my knowledge, these figures20 have not been con-
tested.21 The figures, however, do not disclose that these hold-
ings are concentrated within the three biggest private banks, the
"Grossbanken." Yet there are still good reasons to assume that
the influence exercised by Allianz, the largest insurance enter-
prise, exceeds the corresponding weight of Dresdner Bank or
Commerzbank.
3. In general the sources of retirement funding are the same
as in the United States, but there are significant differences with
regard to their function, structure and respective importance.
Social security in Germany is an old but very comprehensive
system. It covers about ninety percent of the population2 2 and,
after a lifetime of work, it offers a retirement income of about
seventy percent of the recipient's last annual salary. 23 On the
other hand, the third pillar, privately invested savings, appears
to be less important than in the United States. 24 The second pil-
sicherung has acquired control of Bank ffir Gemeinwirtschaft.
"8 Monopolkommission, supra note 16, at 139.
" Informationen des Bundesverbandes deutscher Banken, Zur Diskussion um die
"Macht der Banken" 7 (Sept. 1989).
20 They compare favorably with other institutions; the insurance industry (including
all sorts of pension funds) owns 11.8% of the aggregate equity of German stock corpora-
tions. See Guthardt, Pensionskassen und Bdrse, 43 WERTPAPIER-MITTEILUNMEN 1789
(1989).
2" They are accepted by informed critics like Lambsdorff, Die Macht der Banken,
43 ZErrSCHRWT FOR DAS GANZE KRIrrWESEN HEFT 1, 12 (1990).
22 Stolleis, Hundert Jahre Sozialversicherung in Deutschland, 69 ZEITSCHRIvr FOR
VERSICHERUNGSWISSENSCHAFT 155 (1980).
2 The figure includes the pension paid to "public officials" (judges, diplomats, high
government servants, university professors, etc.) out of the state's tax income.
2 This is certainly true for life insurance and for securities; it is less obvious for real
estate.
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lar, employment-based private pensions, may have the same re-
spective weight in both countries. But in Germany the struc-
tures are radically different. As already mentioned, in Germany
the American-type pension fund is a rare phenomenon. Rather
the system is characterized by the "Pensionszusage," the pen-
sion commitment given by the employer to the employee. The
basic mechanism is simple. The employment contract provides
that the employee, having reached retirement age, will receive
monthly payments of a specified amount. In order to be able to
honor this commitment, the enterprise (not necessarily a corpo-
ration) will start to accumulate reserves. In technical terms the
pension commitment is a tax-relevant liability on the balance
sheet. 5 It therefore generates liquidity which is normally used
for the expansion of the business. All enterprises entering into
pension commitments are under a statutory duty to buy insur-
ance against the risk of insolvency.20 For this purpose, German
industry has organized its own insurance system, the Pensions-
Sicherungs-Verein, Versicherungsverein auf Gegenseitigkeit
(PSV).27
4. The most striking contrasts relate to the markets. The
size and the importance of the German stock market are exem-
plified by just two figures: there are no more than 2,300 German
stock corporations, and fewer than 630 are listed on one of the
German stock exchanges .2 Apart from the very big enterprises,
other forms of business organizations such as the limited part-
nership or the private (closed) company clearly are predomi-
nant. The activity and the depth of the stock market is further
reduced by the traditional attitude favoring long-term invest-
ment and by the comparatively modest impact of institutions.
The internationalization of the securities markets has resulted in
some change. For example, the increasing volatility of the Ger-
man stock market-as illustrated by sharp market breaks on Oc-
tober 19, 1987 and, more recently this year, as a result of the
2 For some time pension commitments could be given off-balance sheet. This regu-
latory gap has fortunately been closed by the statute transforming the Fourth Directive
into German law.
2' For details see W. BLOMEYER & K. Orro, GaSnrErz zuR V assa NUG DER Bnnuxa-
LICHEN ALTERVERSORGuNG 579 (Kommentar 1984).
27 Id. at 781.
Hansen, Das Hochststimmrecht und seine Grenzen, 35 DIE AhTIExN.smscnAr"
R 166 (1990).
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Persian Gulf crisis-is generally attributed to the influx and
sudden withdrawal of American, Japanese and British institu-
tional funds.
But the most significant aspect may be that so far there has
been no real market for control. Of course there are mergers and
acquisitions, but there have been no proxy fights and no serious
unfriendly takeover bids.29 This phenomenon is generally ex-
plained by the very small number of truly public corporations;30
the estimates range from forty to about eighty companies.31 But
this lack of a market for control is still surprising when one con-
siders that some of these corporations enjoy a very substantial
amount of liquid assets. It has even been assumed that in times
of depressed stock prices (such as in early 1988) they have come
close to the aggregate market value of the enterprise. Conse-
quently, there must be and indeed there are other explanations.
One may be the complications resulting from the two-tier board
structure and from codetermination.32 Another may be the role
of the banks"3 and the lack of institutional investors eager to
take large quantities of Deutsche Mark-denominated junk bonds
into their portfolios.
II. ASPIRATIONS FOR REFORM
At least from an American perspective it must be obvious
that a system such as the one I outlined above suffers from very
serious deficiencies. Consequently, there exists in Germany a
certain uneasiness and a growing awareness that some change
will be inevitable. However, the debate is quite heated where
specific reforms are under consideration. I will restrict my com-
ments to a few particularly illustrative examples:
1. Several proposals target the "deregulation"'" of stock cor-
29 Assmann & Bozenhardt, Ubernahmeangebote als Regelungsproblem zwischen
gesellschaftsrechtlichen Normen und zivilrechtlich begrtlndeten Verhaltensgeboten, in
UBERNAHMEANGEBOTE 1 (1989).
1* Monopolkommission, Die Wettbewerbsordnung erweitern, in HAUPTGUTACHTEN
296 (1986-87).
31 Schneider, supra note 12, at 318.
"2 This may be one of the reasons why management today tends to have a more
favorable view of codetermination than 15 years ago.
33 Monopolkommission, supra note 30.
See H. ALBACH, C. CORTE, R. FRiEDEWELD, M. LUTTER & W. RICHTER, DEREGU-
LIERUNG DES AxTIENRECHTS (1988).
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poration law. The recommendations include the abolition of
cumbersome formalities required for the process of incorpora-
tion, for shareholders' meetings and for the listing of smaller
corporations, 5 the abolition of legal capital and par value re-
quirements, the liberalization of corporate distributionss" and
the elimination of mandatory preemptive rights.37 Others sug-
gest that the existing ability to restrict the voting power of block
holdings be outlawed by new mandatory provisions.33 With re-
gard to the underlying policy considerations it is widely, al-
though not universally, agreed that medium-sized and small en-
terprises tend to be undercapitalized and should therefore be
encouraged to go public in order to gain immediate access to the
capital market." This should provide the stock market with
more volume, depth and turnover and thus help to redirect re-
tirement funding from the existing system to American-type
pension funds.40 The most recent and probably the most contro-
versial debate relates to unfriendly takeovers and whether Ger-
many should improve-or even create-the framework condi-
tions for an efficient market of corporate control. It is not
surprising that the arguments in favor and against such mea-
sures follow the much more elaborate American discussion. 1
2. A second major issue is the impact of banks on corporate
governance. The relationship between a bank and a nonbank
corporation may involve the following four elements: (a) provid-
ing the whole range of commercial and investment banking ser-
vices (this is called the "Hausbank" function); (b) under the
German proxy system the banks represent the small sharehold-
ers in shareholders' meetings; (c) a bank manager may sit on the
corporation's supervisory board (or vice versa); and (d) the bank
5Id. at 52.
26 KOBLE, supra note 4, at 55.
KUbler, Mendelson & Mundheim, supra note 6, at 474.
Schneider, Gesetzliches Verbot far Stimmrechtsbeschrankungen bei der Ahtien-
gesellschaft? 35 Din AKTNGESELLSCHAFT 56 (1990); Baums, Hachststimmrechte, 35 DLn
AKT1ENGESELLSC*AFT 221 (1990).
3 For the discussion see Reuter, supra note 15, at B 7. See also F. KOnLER & R.
Scmmr, Gisc.TrSC ncRECHr unD KONZENTRATrON 107 (1988).
" For details, see text accompanying notes 48-53 infra.
41 Assmann & Bozenhardt, supra note 29, at 10; W. WusP17, Pnoaw.x "ram-
DLICHER" UBERNAHMANGEBOTE im AKrmNacHT (1989); Adams, Was spricht gegen eine
unbehinderte Ubertragbarkeit der in Unternehmen gebundenen Ressourcen durch ihre
Eigentamer? 35 Din AKTENGESELCHAnr 243 (1990).
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may own a substantial block of the corporation's stock. The pre-
vailing "cumulation theory" contends that the combination of
these four elements generates an undesirable concentration of
power and therefore calls for legislative action.42 But the "cumu-
lation theory" is not fully supported by empirical evidence. 43 For
example, the large public corporations, in general, have accumu-
lated substantial amounts of liquid assets; for this reason they
are rather independent from commercial and investment bank-
ing services. In the commercial banking area, competition is
tough; the market share of the Big Three accounts for less than
nine percent; they have to compete with other private banks (in-
cluding internationally operating foreign banks), with mutually
linked cooperative banks, and with the public law system of sav-
ings banks which accounts for roughly half of the German
market.44
Another problem is what measures should be taken. So far
nobody has come forward with a plausible concept for a system
of proxy voting that could operate without the assistance of the
banking sector.45 What remains is the proposal of the Monopoly
Commission, an independent body of antitrust experts ap-
pointed by the government to limit bank holdings in nonbank
corporations to a maximum of five percent. 48 If we leave out the
Deutsche Bank-Daimler Benz combination this is not a very
promising proposal. There are already safety and soundness re-
strictions for industrial holdings by banks.47 In addition, there
would have to be a number of exceptions, including those for
underwriting purposes and for corporate reorganizations. Thus,
it appears uncertain if such a measure would produce any real
42 Monopolkommission, supra note 16, at 176; Lambsdorff, supra note 21, at 10.
4 Compare the carefully researched and balanced conclusions of B.RICHT DER
STUDIENKOMMISSION, supra note 13, at 166.
"" For the latest figures see Deposit Insurance Reform and Financial Moderniza-
tion, 1990: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
on Reforming Federal Deposit Insurance, Modernizing the Regulation of Financial Ser-
vices, and Maintaining the International Competitiveness of U.S. Financial Institu-
tions, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990) (statement of U. Cartellieri, June 13, 1990).
" BERCHT DER STUDIENKOMMISSION, supra note 13, at 287; Lambsdorff, supra note
21, at 12. The banks have repeatedly announced that they are not particularly interested
in retaining the present system.
46 Monopolkommission, supra note 16.
Provided by § 12 Kreditwesengesetz, B6iNDESGESETZBLATT, TEnL I [BGB1I] 1472
(1985).
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change.
3. Retirement funding is also a source of permanent con-
cern. The very comprehensive social security system' 8 operates
on a current account basis: the contributions paid in by those
who work are used to provide for the living of those already re-
tired. This is, in a somewhat euphemistic way, called the "gener-
ation contract." This mechanism has several defects: it does not
provide for savings and investment, it increases the burden im-
posed on the working generation as more people grow older and
need more health and other care, and it has difficulties coping
with irregular demographic developments. It is therefore sug-
gested that social security be reduced in order to stimulate pri-
vate savings and investment.9 While this may happen over a
long period of time, a sudden change is highly unlikely.
Within the private sector, the main issue is whether em-
ployment-based retirement funding should be transformed from
the present system of "pension commitments" to an American-
style system of pension funds. This would have to be achieved
by amendments to the tax laws. The conflicting interests and
positions are rather clear. The manufacturing industry wants to
retain the present system,50 while the stock exchanges, "' banks5
2
and insurance companies 53 would like to have the pension funds.
4. A last point, while arguably less important, may serve as
one more example to illustrate the differences between the
American and the German scenes. With the internationalization
of the securities markets, American and other non-German insti-
tutional investors have acquired substantial blocks of stock of
the major German corporations. As in the United States, in-
creased institutional ownership preoccupies management, but
this happens for different reasons. It is not the actual or poten-
tial activity, but rather the inactivity, the lack of interest shown
48 See text accompanying notes 22-27 supra.
4" H. SCHLESINGER, DER B0RGER rST FOR sEoNE Rnm vznGRwoMUCH (CoM-
merzbank 1985); Hauck, Pensionskasse-ein Instrument der Altersuorsorge, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, June 13, 1987, at 13.
E. Reuter (CEO of Daimler Benz), Verhandlungen des 55 DEUrSCHER Junis-
TENTAGES K 181 (1984).
"1 Hauck, supra note 49. Mr. Hauck was a former President of the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange.
11 Guthardt, supra note 20, at 1790. ir. Guthardt is CEO of Deutsche
Genossenschaftsbank.
53 " von Bargen, Verhandlungen des 55 DnurscHnn JumsTFNTAG K 190 (1984).
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by foreign institutional owners, which is viewed as a problem.0 '
The main concern is that decreasing attendance at shareholders'
meetings will produce random majorities and facilitate un-
friendly takeovers. In addition, problems of legitimacy could
arise within the supervisory board if representatives elected by
twenty percent of the owners face representatives elected by
ninety percent of the workers. A study group has begun investi-
gating if and how foreign institutional investors can be en-
couraged to attend shareholders' meetings.
II. THE GERMAN DILEMMA
We have seen that the German system of financial institu-
tions and markets is characterized by a long list of defects and
weak spots. They are particularly obvious when viewed from an
American perspective. The stock market is narrow, thin and bor-
ing. At least in comparison with most of the English-speaking
countries, our industries are thought to be undercapitalized. At
the same time they appear to be dominated by a small number
of big banks. This, in turn, may have several anticompetitive ef-
fects.5 The system of retirement funding is largely controlled by
the political process and by enterprises and therefore, to a much
lesser extent, by markets. The mechanisms of corporate law are
rigid and cumbersome. There is no market for corporate control.
In general, the financial system as a whole is dominated some-
what more by institutions than by markets. It can be assumed
that this impact reduces allocative efficiency and slows down ec-
onomic growth, handicapping the country when it competes with
other nations. In the terms of modern finance theory it is an
underdeveloped system, marked by distinct welfare state fea-
tures which still reflect some of the conflicts and ideologies of
the early stages of industrialization. It may be likened to a
steam engine in the age of computers.
Seen from that perspective there can be no doubt that Ger-
many should not waste its time with incremental modifications
and modest reforms. Rather, we should combine our forces and
efforts to achieve a much more comprehensive and radical
Christians, Der Aktioniir und sein Stimmrecht, 35 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 47
(1990).
"' This is the main concern of the Monopoly Commission. See Monopolkommission,
supra note 16.
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change which would promote us to the stages of a more ad-
vanced capitalism. 6 But even assuming that this could be
achieved by the slow and heavy mechanics of a democratic gov-
ernment, there may be some reasons to hesitate and to think
twice before such radical reform gets underway. Let me explain
this by returning to three issues which have been mentioned
before:
1. The German system of enterprise-based pension commit-
ments clearly suffers from the disadvantage that savings are ac-
cumulated and reinvested by and for the immediate benefit of
the employer. This involves the accumulation of risks for em-
ployees 57 and may, in comparison with the pension fund model,
produce a less efficient resource allocation, since investment de-
cisions are determined by management and not by the capital
market. However, there are some advantages to this system. The
system provides financing not only for public corporations but
also for Jensen-type privately owned enterprises. 8 At the same
time the employees acquire a financial interest in the business of
their employer; this interest increases commensurate with their
length of employment and may benefit the enterprise by im-
proving the motivation and the work attitude of the employ-
ees.59 Of course, they own debt and not equity. But their claims
are long term and not redeemable before retirement and there-
fore show some of the characteristics of equity. This seems to be
particularly true where the sum of the pension reserves, the "so-
cial capital," exceeds the capital contributed by the sharehold-
ers.10 This solution may appear to be very paternalistic. But the
system is based on contract and, more importantly, the employ-
ees participate in the governance of the corporation. Their
agents sit on the supervisory board. This perspective affects and
changes the meaning of codetermination. In reality, the two
"benches" of the supervisory board, shareholders and employ-
"For instance in terms of Clark's model, see note 2 supra.
Higher pensions are not completely covered by the PSV-insurance. Section 3 (3)
Gesetz zur Verbesserung der betrieblichen Altersversorgung, BGB1I 845 (1974).
0 Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, 67 HARv. Bus. Rzv. 61 (Sept.-Oct.
1989).
5 For a general discussion, see Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work?
ESOPs, Law Firms, Codeterminations, and Economic Democracy, 99 YAuL LE . 1749,
1761 (1990).
0 It has to be remembered that with the decline of equity, debt has to bear more of
the risk of equity.
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ees, represent two types or classes of capital rather than an "an-
tagonistic" conflict between owners and workers."1 At the same
time, the character of the enterprise is affected. The corporation
adopts some of the features of a cooperative organization.2 Fi-
nally, there is an impact on labor relations: the system clearly
provides incentives for both sides to understand employment as
a long-term relationship. This encourages human capital invest-
ments by both parties and may produce a better educated and
more highly qualified workforce.
2. The German banking structure can be characterized by
its (comparative) lack of regulation. Private banks are subject to
supervision and to capital and some structural requirements.
The rest are business corporations allowed to offer all sorts of
services to the public. This liberal approach allows the en-
trepreneurial combination of financial services generally referred
to as the "universal bank." This concentration of functions can
produce anticompetitive effects and conflicts of interest 3 which
could be mitigated by imposing the separation of different activ-
ities. But in a moment when Glass-Steagall in the United States
and comparable provisions in Japan seem very close to being re-
pealed, Germany would hardly be well advised to require the
strict separation of commercial banking from investment bank-
ing. Consequently, the only measure that remains available is
the limitation or prohibition of bank holdings in nonbank
corporations.
One of the questions to be asked is how this would affect
the soundness and safety of the banking system.64 Let us assume
that German banks are correctly thought to be comparatively
healthy. This is hardly due to differences in regulation, but
might be explained by the close or even symbiotic relationship
between German banks and German industry. The investment
"' Steindorf, Einzelfragen zur Reichweite des Mitbestimmungsgesetzes, 141 ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSREcHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 457, 464 (1977); F.
KOBLER, W. SCHMIDT & S. SIMiS, MITBESTIMMUNG ALS GESETZGEBUNGSPOLITISCHE Aup-
GABE 195 (1978).
"2 In the sense that it prevents worker ownership to "degenerate" into investor own-
ership, see Hansmann, supra note 59, at 1774.
" BERICHT DER STUDIENKOMMISSION, supra note 13, at 46; Monopolkommission,
supra note 16, at 167.
Compare Clark, supra note 2, at 571 (The "concept of soundness" is the "basic
regulatory approach" to the third stage of capitalism which is characterized by the domi.
nant role of institutional investors and financial intermediaries.).
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of bank funds in blue chip stocks might improve the diversifica-
tion and lower the level of risk in the bank's asset portfolio.
Yet another aspect might be more important. Symbiotic
bank-industry relations are not a one-way street of influence or
control. Manufacturing companies own banking stock and some-
times banks. Industrial managers are sitting on the supervisory
boards of the "Grossbanken," and corporations like Siemens or
Hoechst are enormously important banking customers. At the
same time these corporations depend on the continuation of
banking services. This is particularly obvious with regard to ex-
port financing. Thus the industrial customers and business part-
ners of the banks are more interested in their stability than in
their profitability. This is not to say that any statutory limita-
tion of bank holdings will necessarily be harmful. But it might
well be that the special relationship between private banks and
big corporations generates monitoring effects in both directions
and thus encourages and promotes a certain amount of prudence
in the exercise of the banking business.
3. The last issue is how far Germany should go in order to
provide the framework for a workable market for corporate con-
trol. Assuming for a moment that in the United States the bene-
ficial effects of the takeover game outweigh its costs, the ques-
tion is whether this would be equally true in Germany. This is
uncertain at least with respect to the monitoring of
management.
The supervisory board is an institution that links the public
corporations (including the big private banks) with each other
and with the major unions. The top managers regularly sit on
the boards of other companies.6 5 They have at least one interest
in common: not to shake a system to which they owe their posi-
tions and the opportunities these positions provide, by allowing
obvious violations of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.
This results in a network of mutual monitoring. In comparison
with the United States it considerably reduces the autonomy of
individual (public) corporations. Top management of German
business can be seen as a comparatively homogeneous group of
people interacting to run the private economy or, viewed in
other terms, as a less monocratic than oligarchic structure of
65 But direct cross relations are not allowed. See § 100 (2) 3 Aktienge3etz BGBLI
1089 (1965).
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corporate governance. This interaction, which includes to a lim-
ited extent some of the union leaders, operates as an element of
moderation and balance. For example, management compensa-
tion in Germany is, at least from the point of view of an aca-
demic, by no means paltry. To a certain degree it is linked to the
performance of the corporation. But compared to their Ameri-
can colleagues, with wonderful opportunities for stock options
and golden parachutes, the German top management compensa-
tion looks comparatively poor. The system seems to exercise a
certain function of (re-)distribution, aiming at a balanced rela-
tionship between dividends, salaries and management
compensation.
Up to this point the German dilemma has been stated in a
somewhat narrative or anecdotal form: Germany knows that it
has to modernize, yet it is afraid that by going too far it may
lose more than it wins. Professor Buxbaum's analysis forcefully
asks for a more theoretical definition. But there are limits to
generalization. From my examples it should be obvious that Ger-
many is hardly the "Japan of Europe."6" And the categories of
"liberal" and "corporatist"6 7 may be too traditional and too sim-
ple to cover the increasingly sophisticated blends of "markets
and hierarchies"68 existing today.
For this reason I return to the element of time. I agree with
Professor Buxbaum that little is gained by the mere contraposi-
tion of "short term" versus "long term. '6 9 But his reference to
ecological concerns ° may help my point: the East German expe-
rience clearly demonstrates how, in the long run, irresponsible
pollution affects the interests of enterprises, owners and work-
ers. It may be seen as an element of culture. In Germany, and in
most of Western Europe, financial markets are shaped by more
permanent social relations between enterprises and workers, be-
tween corporations and management and between banks and
manufacturing industry. This appears to indicate a different
"' Buxbaum, Institutional Ownership and the Restructuring of Corporations, in
FESTSCHRIFT FOR E. STEINDORFF 7 (1990).
"7 See Romano, Megapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923
(1984); Buxbaum, supra note 66, at 29.
6' O.Z. WILLUAMSON, THE EcONOMIC INSTITrrIoNS OF CAPITALISM 206 (1985).
" Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 28; but see also Lipton, Corporate Governance in the
Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 7 (1987).
70 Buxbaum, supra note 1, at 28.
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rhythm, perhaps more in line with other segments of society.
Business is slower and steadier; there is less mobility, less
growth and less color and excitement. Germany has no Michael
Milken and no Donald Trump. But there is also more continuity
and somewhat less risk. From such a conservative point of view
the question will be whether Germany can respond to the chal-
lenge of larger markets without losing the balance of its institu-
tional structure.

